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THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS AND LABOUR STANDARDS IN EU 
EXTERNAL TRADE RELATIONS 
 
Samantha Velluti 
 
1. SETTING THE CONTEXT AND FOCUS OF ANALYSIS 
At European Union (EU) level there has been a growing realisation that trade 
and international economic law can have a significant impact on much more than 
economic activity and that they can raise profound questions of social concern. 
As a consequence, the EU has increasingly been employing a social conditionality 
approach, which aims at securing compliance with specified international labour 
standards. The methods used as conditionality are made up of two elements: a punitive method, i.e. the ǲstickǳ, in order to punish proven breaches of human 
rights standards with the elimination of trade preference, by imposing trade 
sanctions against third countries that do not observe them (negative 
conditionality) and an incentive method, i.e. the ǲcarrotǳ, that provides for 
additional preferential treatment through reduced tariffs and market access, to 
reward achievements in respecting and promoting human rights and social and 
environmental standards (positive conditionality).  
The focus of analysis of the paper is on the EUǯs increased practice of promoting 
social rights and international labour standards in its external trade relations, 
unilaterally through the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP; and largely 
under its incentive scheme, namely the GSP+), and at regional and bilateral levels 
via international agreements, which encompass reciprocal or non-reciprocal 
preferential trade links with third countries. Many EU trade agreements include 
social incentive clauses and condition trade concessions and market access on 
the respect and implementation of internationally recognized human rights and 
social and environmental standards. In this context the paper intends to unpack the tensions in the discourse and practice of the EUǯs promotion of social rights 
in its external trade relations.  
EU social trade has received much praise and much criticism. The European 
Commission has claimed that it provides the greatest possible contribution to 
strengthening the social dimension of development cooperation. 1 In a similar 
vein, some have argued that there is evidence showing an improvement in 
labour rights in the signatory countries of EU preferential trade agreements, 
which is exhibited ex post as a result of learning by civil society actors during the 
implementation phase of labour provisions.2 At the other end of the spectrum, it 
                                                        
1 European Commission – ILO, Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of a 
strategic partnership between the International Labour Organisation and the Commission of the 
European Communities in the field of Development, 17 July 2004, Brussels and 16 July 2004, 
Geneva, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/memorandum-of-
understanding-ec-ilo-2004_en.pdf>. 
2 E. Postnikov and ). Bastiaens, ǮDoes dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in EU 
preferential trade agreementsǯ ʹͳ Journal of European Public Policy 2014, 923-940. 
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has been argued that the GSP programme has allowed the EU to provide 
significant trade benefits to countries that have abhorrent human and labour 
rights records 3 and that the GSP+ scheme and its conditionality has not yet resulted in significant changes in the situation ǲon the groundǳ in beneficiary 
countries. 4  
The above diverse if not opposing views about EU social conditionality 
immediately present us with the controversy surrounding the trade-labour 
linkage and a certain degree of scepticism in relation to the effectiveness of any 
policy, agreement, measure or arrangement aimed at linking non-commercial 
objectives to trade. It also brings to light issues of legitimacy and credibility of EU 
external action particularly in relation to the EUǯs normative mission as a global 
human rights actor, which has been reinforced by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. 
Despite the major changes introduced by this Treaty in relation to the 
constitutional design of EU external relations, 5 particularly in relation to the EU 
external commercial competence, 6 the EUǯs authority to act on external matters of trade and labour is all but clear. Even though the scope of the EUǯs Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) has been interpreted broadly by the EU Court of Justice 
(CJEU),7 labour issues in trade agreements are not part of the EUǯs exclusive 
competence and remain within Member Statesǯ competence giving rise to the 
phenomenon of mixed agreements. 8  
Equally problematic is another key change of the Treaty of Lisbon, namely, the 
injection of a normative approach into EU external relations via Article 3(5) and 
21 TEU. Here, issues of consistency and coherence in the EU external action 
inevitably remain, which are explained to a great extent by the extant complexity 
of the EUǯs external relations framework originating in the duality between its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the non-CFSP competences and 
                                                        
3 J. Vogt, ǮA Little Less Conversation: The EU and the ȋNonȌ Application of Labour Conditionality 
in the Generalised System of Preferences ȋGSPȌǯ ͵ͳ International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations 2015, 285-304. 
4  CAR)S, ǮMid-term Evaluation of the EUǯs Generalised System of Preferencesǯ, Report 
commissioned by the EC, Brighton: Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex, 
University of Sussex, 2010, available at <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/caris/projects>. The final 
report is available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146196.pdf>. 
5 T. Ramopoulos and J. Wouters, ǮCharting the Legal Landscape of EU External Relations Post-Lisbonǯ Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper N. 156 – March 2015, 
available at <https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp151-
160/wp156-ramopoulos-wouters.pdf>. 
6 E.g. Articles 3(1)e TFEU, 206, 207 and 218 TFEU; see further, G. Villalta Puig and B. Al-Haddab ǮThe Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: An Analysis of Reformsǯ ͵͸ ELRev ʹͲͳͳ, ʹͺͻ and M. Bungenberg and C. (ermann ȋedsȌ ǮCommon Commercial Policy after Lisbonǯ, European 
Yearbook of International Economic Law/Special Issue (Heidelberg: Springer 2013). 
7 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart 2015), Chs. 2-3. 
8 C. Hillion, P. Koutrakos (eds) Mixed Agreements Revisited - The EU and its Member States in the 
World ȋOxford: (art ʹͲͳͲȌ; C. Timmermans ǮThe Court of Justice and Mixed Agreementsǯ in A. 
Rosas, E. Levits and Y. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and 
Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2013), 659-674. 
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maintained by the Treaty of Lisbon.. 9 The uneven balance between ǲhighǳ and ǲlowǳ politics of EU external actions 10 still justifies the selection of two different 
sets of substantive policy-making and implementation procedures to cover ǲpoliticalǳ and ǲeconomicǳ aspects of EU external action, in spite of the single 
procedure envisaged in Article 218 TFEU for the adoption of international 
agreements. This unclear EU external relations framework has been made most 
visible by a series of inter-institutional disputes in the field of external 
representation and conclusion of international agreements.11  
When it comes to issues that go beyond trade, as most international agreements 
of the EU do, potential conflicts are not limited to the content of the agreements 
but also extend to the very objectives pursued by these agreements. To put it 
shortly, is linking trade to labour a way of protecting domestic industries or 
promoting EU values? In this context other questions arise concerning the way 
the EU furthers the trade-labour linkage and, chiefly, what are the reasons for the EUǯs reluctance to include a legally enforceable social clause in trade 
agreements?12 
The paper takes as a starting point the fact that while the EU portrays itself 
externally as speaking with a ǲsingle voiceǳ to its trade partners, internally the 
lack of a clear division of competences shows that it operates as a ǲpluralistic entityǳ through a pooling of international representation of various internal 
actors. As a ǲconflicted trade powerǳ13 the EU cannot always exert real influence 
externally particularly when the trading partner is a powerful global economic 
or geopolitical player. Linked to this, EU external trade policy is highly driven, 
                                                        
9 Article ʹͶȋͳȌ second paragraph TEU which stipulates that the CFSP Ǯis subject to specific rules and proceduresǯ. 
10 The term ǲhighǳ politics refers to foreign policy sensu stricto and it concerns international or national security; ǲlowǳ politics refers to policies and measures which are not essential to world 
or national security, such as economic or social policies and development aid.  
11 P. Van Elsuwege, ǲThe Potential for )nter-Institutional Conflicts before the Court of Justice: 
Impact of the Lisbon Treatyǳ in M. Cremona and A. Thies ȋEds.Ȍ, The European Court of Justice and 
External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Oxford: Hart, 2014), pp. 123–24. The Mauritius 
case (Case C-658/11 European Parliament v Council ECLI: EU:C:2014:2025) concerning the 
action for annulment by the European Parliament against a Council Decision on the signing and 
conclusion of an agreement with Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and 
associated seized property from the EU-led naval force to Mauritius, and their treatment 
subsequent to their transfer (Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP [2011] OJ L 254/1, 30.9.2011), 
shows that the CFSP is no longer isolated from the rest of the EU legal order, even though no 
control of substance is possible other than that envisaged in Article 275(2) TFEU in connection 
with Article 40 TEU (the so-called ǲmutual non-affectation clauseǳȌ and Article ʹͳͷ TFEU 
(concerning restrictive measures against natural or legal persons). In particular, the case shows 
how Article 218 TFEU provides for a single procedure for negotiating and concluding 
international agreements, spanning the supranational pillar and the former intergovernmental 
pillar of the CFSP and Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ).  
12 The only exceptions are the GSP scheme and the 2008 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with Caribbean countries (CARICOM and the Dominican Republic), where a 
weak form of conditionality is envisaged.   
13 S. Meunier and K. Nicolaïdis, ǮThe European Union as a conflicted trade powerǯ ͳ͵ Journal of 
European Public Policy 2007, 906. 
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albeit not exclusively, by domestic-societal vested interests with exporters being 
key drivers of the EUǯs recent leverage agenda. 14 
For the above reasons, EU discourse and practice in relation to social 
conditionality in trade offer a rather complicated picture. On the one hand, they 
seem to indicate that the EU utilises the trade-labour linkage as an invaluable 
development tool. On the other hand, the absence of a uniform and coherent 
understanding and approach to the trade-labour linkage and the reticence to rely 
on hard conditionality in certain cases of serious labour violations seems to 
suggest that the EU utilises the trade-labour linkage instrumentally and in a 
carefully planned manner as part of broader strategic geo-political, economic 
and foreign policy objectives. In the latter instance, this reticence seems to 
demonstrate that the EU is not willing to go beyond the realm of rhetoric.  
Against this background, the paper intends to investigate whether a deeper analysis of the EUǯs social conditionality discourse and practice shows a strong 
commitment of the EU towards the promotion of social rights and labour 
standards in its external trade relations that transcends any form of reticence 
and goes beyond the realm of rhetoric. With the changes introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon social clauses in trade agreements are not mere EU foreign 
policy instruments but rather mechanisms that the EU should use to comply with 
its obligations under the EU Treaties, particularly in the light of Articles 3(5) and 
21(1) TEU which recognize economic and social rights as a matter of justice that 
must be extended to external trade relations.  
The paper starts by looking at the importance of the EUǯs role as a global human 
rights actor within the broader framework of 21st century globalisation. This 
analysis is important because it helps us to better understand and evaluate the 
way the EU promotes social rights and labour standards in its external trade 
relations. The paper then proceeds to examining the main rationales of the 
trade-labour linkage followed by a critical evaluation of social conditionality in 
EU external trade relations drawing examples from previous and current EU 
practice at unilateral, regional and bilateral levels. The conclusion brings 
together and reflects on the main findings of the paper. 
 
2. THE EU AS A REGIONAL ENTITY WITH A ǲGLOBAL VOCATIONǳ AND A ǲSOCIAL AMBITIONǳ 
As a supranational order the EU has an important role in the context of new 
globalisation and transnational forces that dominate the 21st century, which 
involve a new geography of trade and a trend towards growing multipolarity. As 
global trends have come to dismantle barriers, bringing about destabilization 
                                                        
14 For further discussion in the context of domestic politics and how the former shapes different 
strategies of the EU and the United States (US) towards social standards, see T. Leeg, ǮCarrots or Sticks? Social Standards in Preferential Trade Agreements of the EU and the USǯ, paper presented at the Young Researchersǯ Master Class, European Union in )nternational Affairs ȋEU)AȌ Biennial 
Conference, Brussels, Belgium, 11-13 May 2016. 
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and imposing changes at domestic level, law inevitably has had to follow suit. 
This in turn has led to a scenario whereby not only have legal techniques become 
outmoded and the need for change become conspicuous but, significantly, the 
aspirations of law and policy have themselves also undergone transformation.15 Lobel notes that Ǯin many contexts, the interconnections between the object of 
regulation (the economy) and the strategy by which it is regulated (law) 
motivate the push for renewal through the adoption of market practices in the public sphereǯ. 16 This overarching change has established a link between 
contemporary problems in the organization of the economy and innovative legal 
theory on regulation and governance to react to increasing heterogeneity.  
The EU may thus provide the forum for the effective systematisation of these new 
transnational processes by providing non-state actors with a specific role in the 
policy-making process. In addition, the EU can foster the protection of economic 
and social rights by assigning the role of ǲguarantorǳ and ǲorganiserǳ to national 
legislation. Externally, the EU forms an integral part of a postmodern trend in 
international capitalism, which increases processes of privatization of the law 
and promotes a stronger legal culture of contract. In this context, the EU has 
acquired a unique role, acting on the one hand as a liberalizing force for 
international capitalism and, on the other, as a regulator of globalizing economic 
forces. 17 In this context, the new forms of governance that have come to life 
should therefore be seen as a product of the contingencies of history and 
transnationalism, with multiple overlapping and conflicting juridiscape. 18 The 
blurring of the public-private divide has significant implications in relation to the question of the EUǯs polity identity as it raises questions on whether government 
is public, private or a combination of the two. )n this broad and fluid ǲfusion zoneǳ the public sector becomes more open to the dynamics, techniques and 
language of the market, whereas private actors have to deal with conditions set 
by public authority or integrate broader citizen concerns on their own initiative 
and to improve their market position, often under the banner of corporate social 
responsibility. 19  
This new scenario in global governance can be seen in the context of social trade 
where the EU has started to deploy a mixture of law and policy instruments and 
interacting with different actors to foster the trade-labour linkage, particularly in 
the context of the new generation of free trade agreements (FTAs) where 
organized civil society has been given an important role in the implementation 
                                                        
15 O. Lobel, ǮThe Renewal Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thoughtǯ, ͺͻ Minnesota Law Review 2004, at 364.  
16 ibid., at 366.  
17 S. Velluti, New Governance and the European Employment Strategy (London: Routledge 2010) p. 
15. 
18 A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation (Minneapolis MN: 
University of Minnesota Press 1996).  
19 S. Smismans, Governance: The Solution for Active European Citizenship, or the End of Citizenship?ǯ ͳ͵ Columbia Journal of European Law 2007, 619-620.  
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and monitoring of the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter of these 
agreements. As Reddy puts it: 20 
 Ǯit is reasonable to suggest that the world trading system must be evaluated, at 
least in part, according to the consequences that it generates, and that these 
can in turn be assessed according to criteria which are, at least in part, public and shared. […] International human rights instruments and global 
development goals, imperfect though they are, testify to the possibility of such concurrence.ǯ  
 
The EU constitutes a formidable platform for developing an integrated system to 
further diverse goals through the coordinated action of various institutions. It is 
a regional body with an embedded integrated approach to goals as evidenced 
increasingly by its Internal Market law and policy, which relies on a common 
institutional structure and the combined use of negative and positive forms of 
harmonization for achieving them. Moreover, as a regional entity with a ǲglobal 
vocationǳ21 to promote global human rights, the EU now has a regulatory 
framework enabling it to mobilize various instruments of governance in a social 
perspective. 22  
The EU stands as a model of highly competitive social market economy 23 Ǯreflecting the ambition of furthering diverse economic and social aims 
simultaneously, however much that model is both incomplete and under 
threat.ǯ24 The Treaty of Lisbon has refocused attention on a holistic approach to 
European integration and the goals of full employment, social progress and 
cohesion have been relaunched in the context of a new Ǯhighly competitive social market economyǯ. 25 These goals cannot be ignored when seeking to promote fair 
and sustainable market growth. Article 9 TFEU promotes social mainstreaming 
for the attainment of these non-economic goals and may thus be defined as a ǲhorizontal social clauseǳ, which is in line with other horizontal clauses in the 
TFEU concerning gender equality, environmental protection, consumer 
protection and the fight against discrimination 26 and has to be taken into 
account in the adoption and implementation of all EU actions and policies, 27 
                                                        
20 S. Reddy, ǮForeword. )nternational Trade as a Means to Diverse Ends: Development, Workers, 
the Environment, and Global Public Goodsǯ in O. De Schutter, Trade in Service of Sustainable 
Development (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015) p. v. 
21 M. Cremona, ǮRhetoric and Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a Multilateral Contextǯ 
38 Common Market Law Review 2001, 359-396.  
22 A. Perulli, ǮFundamental Social Rights, Market Regulation and EU External Actionǯ, ͵Ͳ The 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 2014, at 37.  
23 Article 3(3) TEU.  
24 See S. Reddy, supra note ʹͲ, at xv; for further analysis, see D. Damjanovic, ǮThe EU Market Rules as Social Market Rules: Why the EU can be a Social Market Economyǯ ͷͲ Common Market Law 
Review 2013, 1685-1718. 
25 See A. Perulli, supra note 22, at 34.  
26 Articles 8, 10, 11 and 12 TFEU.  
27 See A. Perulli, supra note 22, at 34.  
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including external relations.  
Article 3 TEU and Articles 34-36 in Chapter IV on ǮSolidarityǯ of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which can be considered the main provisions 
for adopting redistributive social policies, while not justiciable 28 or not creating 
new competences for the Union with regard to these welfare areas, 29 remain 
nevertheless legal norms which can be used within the negative welfare 
integration process and thus be employed for developing the EU social market 
economy. 30 EU market rules, namely competition and state aid law, the free 
movement rules and the public procurement rules, can also be read as enabling 
social market rules for the creation of a social market economy, particularly after 
the revisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. 31 This is not to deny that at present the 
way labour rights are balanced against economic rights such as, for example, the 
right to provide services in the Internal Market remains problematic or that 
labour law standards are somewhat restricted because they need to comply with 
economic paradigms. Laval, 32  Rüffert, 33  Bundesdruckerei 34  and Regiopost 35 
illustrate how socially responsible public procurement remains difficult to 
pursue and thus confirm the downgrading of labour law standardsǯ relevance. 
However, the argument that this cannot change in the future should not be 
entirely dismissed. That the EU is, or better-said, portrays itself as a model of 
social market economy, can be seen by the fact that the promotion of non-
commercial objectives through trade relations has gained significant prominence 
in EU external action, particularly since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The latter reinforced the EUǯs external commercial competence 36 whilst, 
at the same time, injecting a normative dimension in its international relations 
                                                        
28 The main reason of their lack of justiciability is that they are mainly construed as principles; 
the difference between rights and principles is enshrined in Articles 51(1) and 52(5) of the EU 
Charter. )n particular, the latter speaks about principles being Ǯjudicially cognisableǯ only in 
relation to the interpretation of their implementing acts and the ruling on their legality. For further examination, see M. Delfino, ǮThe Court and the Charter. A ǲConsistentǳ )nterpretation of Fundamental Social Rights and Principlesǯ ͸ European Labour Law Journal 2015, 86-99 and S. 
Robin-Olivier, ǮThe Contribution of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the protection of social 
rights in the European Union: a first assessment after Lisbonǯ ͳ European Journal of Human 
Rights 2013, 109-134.  
29 Article 51(2) of the EU Charter.  
30 See D. Damjanovic, supra note 24, at 1715.  
31 ibid., at 1689.  
32  Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet  
ECLI:EU:C:2007:809. 
33 Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen ECLI:EU:C:2008:189.  
34 Case C-549/13, Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235.  
35 Case-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG v Stadt Landau in der Pfalz ECLI:EU:C:2015:760. The 
decision in Regiopost highlights once again the complexities of using contracts to pursue 
contract-unrelated policies such as social considerations. While it reverses Rüffert thus opening 
new horizons for the protection of posted workers and space for regional protection, collective 
negotiation and action remain restricted. 
36 Article 3(1)e TFEU and Articles 206 and 207 TFEU and 218 TFEU (in relation to the increased 
powers of the EU Parliament in the CCP).  
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via Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU, thus advancing values, principles and objectives that are emphatically presented as ǲEuropeanǳ and whose universal application 
is sought via explicit reference to compliance with international law. 37 Further, 
the objective of consistency has also been included in the CCP with the obligation 
for the Union to conduct its policy in the broader context of the principles and 
objectives of the Unionǯs external action. 38 In addition, there is an obligation to 
respect human rights externally pursuant to Article 21(3)(1) TEU. 39 Through the 
insertion of foreign policy objectives, the EUǯs ǲcommon ideologyǳ, enshrined 
largely in the Treaty on European Union, has now acquired an external 
dimension, which also expresses the core principles of how its community is to 
shape the international order and a particular vision of global governance 
itself.40 
 
3. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE TRADE-LABOUR LINKAGE  
 
3.1. THE TRADE-LABOUR LINKAGE RATIONALES  
Various rationales for including labour provisions in trade agreements have been 
put forward, namely, a social, economic and human rights rationale.41 The 
overarching reason is the existence of interdependence between different set of 
problems and objectives. 42 Following on from this is the other equally important 
rationale of creating incentives for actors and, in particular, states to take actions 
which are desirable or to refrain from taking actions which are undesirable in 
terms of labour standards. 43 The social rationale aims at providing redress 
against the negative social effects of globalisation processes and it is meant to 
ensure the enforcement of domestic labour laws concerning the protection of 
workers in compliance with common international labour standards thus 
reflecting a broader concern for safeguarding social protection. The economic 
                                                        
37 S. Velluti, Ǯ(uman rights conditionality in the EU GSP scheme: "a focus on those in need or a need to refocus?ǳǯ in Ferreira, N. and Kostakopoulou, D. ȋedsȌ The human face of the European 
Union: is EU law and policy humane enough? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016), 
forthcoming.  
38 Articles 207(1) TFEU; 3(5) TEU.  
39 L. Bartels, ǮThe EUǯs (uman Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effectsǯ ʹͷ European Journal of International Law 2014, 1071-ͳͲͻͳ; cfr. E. Cannizzaro, ǮThe EUǯs 
Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with Extraterritorial Effects: A Reply to Lorand Bartelsǯ ʹͷ European Journal of International Law 2014, 1093-1099.  
40 J. Larik, ǮEntrenching Global Governance: The EUǯs Constitutional Objectives Caught Between a Sanguine World View and a Daunting Realityǯ in B. Van Vooren et al. ȋedsȌ The EU’s Role in Global 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013) p. 20.  
41 ILO, Report on The Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements, 6 November 2013, 6-7, 
available at <http://www.ilo.org/global/research/publications/WCMS_228965/lang--
en/index.htm>; see also European Commission, Final report on The Use, Scope and Effectiveness 
of Labour and Social Provisions and Sustainable Development Aspects in Bilateral and Regional 
Free Trade Agreements, 15 September 2008, Chapter 2, available at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=89&furtherNews=yes&langId=en&newsId=480> 
accessed 10 December 2014. 
42 See S. Reddy, supra note 20, at vi-xi.  
43 ibid., at ix-xi.  
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rationale is premised on the idea of using labour provisions as tools to prevent 
unfair competition by ensuring a level playing-field to encourage labour 
standards in the exporting country that are comparable with those in the 
importing country. In this context fair trade is thus a means to implement free 
trade. 44 The International Labour Organization (ILO) Constitution Preamble provides that: Ǯthe failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is 
an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries.ǯ 45 Arguably, any WTO member could claim that another memberǯs failure to respect social rights impedes its ability to uphold social 
rights within its own territory. 46 The reason would be that a stateǯs tolerance of 
labour violations could significantly undermine another stateǯs protection of 
labour by increasing the pressure on that state to tolerate similar labour abuses 
or risk losing investments to the violation. 47 In the 2008 ILO Declaration on 
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization 48 it is stated that: Ǯthe violation of 
fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be invoked or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage.ǯ The Declaration recognized the impact of 
trade and financial policies on employment and social rights and referred to the 
need to develop and employ an integrated approach in the promotion of decent 
work, through the cooperation with other international and regional 
organizations. 49 The human rights rationale uses labour provisions as a means 
for ensuring respect for labour-related human rights that reflect values 
universally accepted by the international community and also for improving 
labour standards generally.  
The existence of such diverse rationales underlying the labour-trade linkage 
requires us to acknowledge that there isnǯt a single, privileged form of 
justification for rights. To date there has been a tendency to believe that 
engaging philosophically with human rights equates to engaging with them as a 
by-product of some commitment to a broader moral theory. 50 As Tasioulas aptly 
points out, this is a limitative and privileged vision of how to conceive a 
philosophical account of human rightsǯ justification and such an approach must 
be challenged, precisely because there may be overlapping strands that go 
towards justifying each right. 51 What matters is that we attempt to make sense 
                                                        
44 See A. Perulli, supra note 22, at 31. 
45 International Labour Organisation (ILO), Constitution of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), 1 April 1919.  
46 C. Thomas, ǮThe WTO and Labour Rights: Strategies of Linkageǯ in S. Joseph et al. (eds.) The 
World Trade Organisation and Human Rights. Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cheltenham: Elgar 
2009), at 257.  
47 idem. 
48  Available at <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
cabinet/documents/genericdocument/wcms_371208.pdf>. 
49 See A. Perulli, supra note 22, at 31.  
50 J. Tasioulas, On Human Rights, available at <http://fivebooks.com/interview/human-rights/>. 
51 idem. 
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of human rights 52 and abandon the philosophical mistake to reduce everything 
to a system where everything follows from a set of given principles. 53 
 
3.2. THE EU CONTEXT AND THE DEMOCRATISING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
Three broad forces have maintained and increased the demand for EU social 
measures linked to transnational trade processes: the pace of globalisation; the 
risk of trade policy failure and associated adjustment measures as well as 
changes in the institutional framework of key international organisations. 54 The EU Parliamentǯs increased role and visibility in EU external relations following 
the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon also constitutes an important 
factor in furthering the social dimension of EU international trade agreements. 
According to a study that looks at why the EU Parliament is such a strong 
supporter of linking social norms to EU trade policy, the notion of social trade is 
a story-line around which coalitions in the EU Parliament can unite, because its 
construction is vague and can thus be subject to different interpretations. 55 This 
is good in terms of yielding broad consensus among very different political 
groups within the EU Parliament, but it is bound to generate provisions in 
legislative measures or clauses in international agreements, which are watered 
down in terms of their legal enforceability to the extent that it will be harder to 
ensure effective implementation and coherence in terms of results, the Trade 
and Sustainable Development Chapter in the new FTAs is a case in point. As the 
analysis shows further below, what we end up having is an asymmetric 
relationship between the labour and trade provisions whereby the former are 
either not prescriptive in nature or not legally enforceable.  
The EU Parliament remains a strong advocate of the trade-labour linkage. This 
flows from its ongoing commitment to the protection of human rights lato sensu 
as well as its democratic legitimation function that may be said to be 
independent and separate from that of the Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon 
has given the EU Parliament a stronger role in relation to the conclusion of 
international agreements, which is of great significance given that it constitutes a 
formally independent voice for EU citizens. 56 The EU Parliament has been given 
                                                        
52 J. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2007).  
53 See J. Tasioulas, supra note 50.  
54 S. Velluti, ǮThe EU's social dimension in its external trade relationsǯ in A. Marx et al. (eds.), 
Global Governance of Labour Rights. Assessing the Effectiveness of Transnational Public and Private 
Policy Initiatives (Cheltenham: Elgar 2015), 42-62. 
55 L. Van den Putte, ǮDivided We Stand – The European Parliamentǯs Position on Social Trade in 
the Post-Lisbon Eraǯ in A. Marx et al. (eds.), supra note 54, 63-82. 
56 On the powers of the EU Parliament in the external relations of the EU post-Lisbon, see C. Eckes, Ǯ(ow the European Parliamentǯs Participation in )nternational Relations Affects the Deep Tissue of the EUǯs Power Structuresǯ, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/14, available at 
<http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/how-the-european-parliaments-participation-in-
international-relations-affects-the-deep-tissue-of-the-eus-power-structures/>; K Raube and J Wouters, ǮThe Many Facets of Parliamentary )nvolvement and Interaction in EU External Relationsǯ, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. ͳ͹Ͷ – April 2016.    
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a right to be informed at all stages of the procedure for adopting international 
agreements. 57 It has also acquired a general power of veto by either giving 
consent or rejecting international agreements. 58  It is noticeable, however, that 
the EU Parliament cannot introduce amendments to the text of the proposed 
agreement but only entirely approve it or entirely reject it. There is thus no ex 
ante formal control of the EU Parliament envisaged in Article 218 TFEU. 59 In 
spite of this limitation, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the EU 
Parliament has used its increased powers forcefully and it has refused to give its 
consent to various international agreements such as the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program (TFTP) with the United States 60 to protect data protection 
rights of EU citizens 61 and the multilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) 62 for potential threat to civil liberties. 63 Similarly, the EU Parliament has 
refused to give its consent to the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement64 
inter alia because further to the 2002 Opinion of the UN Legal Counsel Hans 
Corell there was no evidence in the agreement that the fishery activities were to 
                                                        
57 Article 218(10) TFEU (and specifically for international trade agreements Article 207(3) 
TFEU); see also the Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and 
the Commission, OJ [2010] L304/47, 20.11.2010, Annex 11, which goes beyond the strict wording of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU thereby strengthening the EU Parliamentǯs 
role in the negotiations and conclusion of international agreements. It could be argued that this 
agreement is an expression of the duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU and the 
principle of inter-institutional balance as per Article 13(2) TEU; see also Case C-658/11 
European Parliament v Council ECLI: EU:C:2014:2025 (the Mauritius case). 
58 Article 218(6)(a) (i)-(v) TFEU; compare with former Article 300(3) subpara. 2 TEC.  
59 A. Ripoll Servent, ǮThe Role of the European parliament in international negotiations after Lisbonǯ ʹͳ Journal of European Public Policy 2014, 568-586.  
60 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing 
and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ [2010] L8/11, 13.1.2010.  
61 European Parliament, P7_TA(2010)0029 Legislative Resolution of 11 February 2010 on the 
proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union 
and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data 
from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program (05305/1/2010 REV 1 – C7-0004/2010 – 2009/0190(NLE)). 
62 Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the 
United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the 
Swiss Confederation and the United States of America, 12195/11, 2011.   
63 European Parliament, P7_TA-PROV(2012)0287. Legislative Resolution of 4 July 2012 on the 
draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the 
United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the 
Swiss Confederation and the United States of America, 12195/11, 2011-C7-0027/2012-
2011/0167(NLE)).  
64 European Parliament, P7_TA(2011)0569, Legislative Resolution of 14 December 2011 on the 
draft Council decision on the conclusion of a Protocol between the European Union and the 
Kingdom of Morocco setting out the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided 
for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom 
of Morocco (11226/2011-C7-0201/2011-2011/0139(NLE)).  
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the benefit of, and according to, the wishes of the people of Western Sahara. 65 In 
Frente Polisario the EU General Court (GC) has ordered the partial annulment of 
a Council Decision on the conclusion of an agricultural, processed agricultural 
and fisheries products agreement with Morocco insofar as it is applied to 
Western Sahara. 66 As explained by Vidigal, 67 this landmark ruling is important 
in a number of respects. First, the EU is under an obligation to ensure respect for 
the fundamental rights of non-EU nationals in non-EU territory. 68 Second, ǲentirely neutralǳ agreements, which do not require the violation of fundamental 
rights, may still fail to conform to this obligation if they favour the occurrence of 
such a violation. 69 Third, the fact that an agreement may Ǯindirectly encourageǯ 
the violations of fundamental rights, or that the EU Ǯbenefits from themǯ, is 
sufficient to trigger the duty to take into account the specific elements of the 
agreement. 70 In other words, even if a violation of fundamental rights is not 
an object of the agreement, such a violation may be its consequence or an effect.71 
With regard to the ILO Conventions and in particular CLS, in December 2011 the 
EU Parliament voted to block the textile agreement between the EU and 
Uzbekistan for the countryǯs continuous use of a state-sponsored system of 
cotton production based on forced labour of children and adults. 72  
From the above, we can see that with the Treaty of Lisbon the EU Parliament has 
acquired renewed democratic legitimation and monitoring control functions in 
relation to international agreements that it clearly intends to exercise. Combined 
with its promotion of human rights generally the EU Parliament has undoubtedly 
acquired an increasingly important role in relation to social trade.   
 ͵.͵. SOC)AL TRADE AS AN ǲUNOBJECT)ONABLE NORMǳ AND THE EUǯS NEW 
COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY 
The analysis carried out in the preceding sections helps us to understand the 
reasons for the widening and deepening of labour provisions in EU trade 
                                                        
65 Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal 
Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council, 
S/2002/161, 12 February 2022, available at:<http://www.arso.org/UNlegaladv.htm>.  
66 Council Decision 2012/497/EU of 8 March 2012; Case T-512/12 Frente Polisario v Council of 
the European Union ECLI:EU:T:2015:953 (nyr). An appeal against this decision has been lodged 
before the CJEU, Case-104/16 P Council v Frente Polisario ECLI:EU:C:2016:232 (pending case). 
67 G. Vidigal, ǮTrade Agreements, EU Law, and Occupied Territories ȋʹȌ: The General Court 
Judgment in Frente Polisario v Council and the Protection of Fundamental Rights Abroadǯ EJ)L: 
Talk!, 11 December 2015, available at <http://www.ejiltalk.org/13901-2/>. 
68 Case-104/16 P, paras. 227-228. 
69 Case-104/16 P, paras. 239-241 and 246.  
70 Case-104/16 P, paras. 231 and 238. 
71 See Vidigal, supra note 67.  
72 EU Parliament Resolution of 15 December 2011 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion 
of a Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, of the other part, amending the Agreement in order to extend the provisions of the 
Agreement to bilateral trade in textiles, taking account of the expiry of the bilateral textiles 
Agreement (16384/2010 – C7-0097/2011 –2010/0323(NLE)), P7_TA(2011)0586.  
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agreements and why social trade has rapidly become an ǲunobjectionable normǳ 
in the EU context, which has also been used to find public support in the face of 
criticism against FTAs. 73 The status of ǲunobjectionable normǳ acquired by 
social trade has become embedded in EU discourse and practice not only 
externally but also internally. The EU is integrating social, labour and 
environmental standards in important areas of the Internal Market, such as for 
example public procurement, as illustrated by Directive 2014/24/EU. 74 The 
Directive links public procurement with sustainable development and injects an 
approach based on social responsibility and solidarity. At all stages of the 
procedure there is now an obligation for Member States and contracting 
authorities to comply with social and environmental legislation and labour law 
and to combat excessively low tenders.75 Another example is the Renewable 
Energy Directive,76 which introduces ǲsocial sustainability criteriaǳ and linked to 
the latter a reporting system concerning the ratification and implementation of 
certain conventions of the ILO. 77  
The Treaty of Lisbon has constitutionalized this complementarity and 
parallelism between the internal and external dimension of EU action first 
developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 78 With regard to 
the scope of the CCP, this entails that when the EU exercises its powers under the 
                                                        
73 L. Van den Putte and J. Orbie, ǮEU bilateral agreements and the surprising rise of labour provisionsǯ ͵ͳ International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 2015, 
263-283.  
74 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ [2014] L94/65, 28.3.2014; for further analysis, see E. Van den Abeele, Ǯ)ntegrating social and environmental dimensions in public procurement: one small step for the )nternal Market, one giant leap for the EU?ǯ ETU) 
Working Paper 2014.08, available at <http://www.etui.org/Publications2/Working-Papers>. 
75 Article 18(2) and Recital 37; Annex X which lists the International Social and Environmental 
Conventions mentioned in Article 18(2), Article 69; see also Article 71 which is aimed at 
preventing subcontracting chains.  
76 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently 
repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ [2009] L 140/16, 5.6.2009.  
77 For further analysis, see A. Lendle and M. Schaus, ǮSustainability Criteria in the EU Renewable Energy Directive: Consistent with WTO Rules?ǯ )CTSD information note No. ʹ, SEPTEMBER ʹͲͳͲ, 
available at <http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2011/12/sustainability-criteria-in-the-eu-
renewable-energy-directive-consistent-with-wto-rules.pdf>; L. German and G. Schoneveld, ǮSocial 
sustainability of EU-approved voluntary schemes for biofuels )mplications for rural livelihoodsǯ 
Center for International Forestry Research, Working Paper 75/2011, available at 
<http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP75German.pdf>; S. Bigerna, C. A. 
Bollino and S. Micheli, The Sustainability of Renewable Energy in Europe (Heidelberg: Springer 
2015); information on national action plans and progress reports is available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive>.   
78 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Cornelis Kramer and Others [1976] ECR 1279 and Opinion 1/76 
Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels [1977] ECR 
741. Article 21(3) TEU provides that the Unionǯs general external policy objectives should be respected and pursued also in ǲthe development and implementation of the external aspects of 
its other policiesǳ and Article 207 (3)-(2) TFEU provides that the EUǯs CCP agreements shall be 
compatible with internal Union policies and rules; Article 207(6)(a) TFEU establishes explicit 
parallelism between internal and external EU competences. External powers cannot be used to 
override the limits of internal Union competence with regard to the same subject matter.  
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CCP, it is subject to the same limitations on its competence that exist in the 
Internal Market with regard to the same subject matter. However, as Dimopoulos 
posits: Ǯthis does not mean that the lack of exercise of Union internal 
competences poses a limitation on the existence or the exercise of external competenceǯ. 79 New Article 207 TFEU somewhat differs from its predecessor 80 
as it enables the EU to depart from a strict parallelism between internal and 
external economic relations 81 thus marking a new approach of the CJEU to the objectives of the EU in the context of the CCP, from ǲevolutionaryǳ to ǲglobalǳ. 82 The shift towards a ǲglobal approachǳ in its interpretation of Treaty provisions is 
particularly salient for the purposes of the present analysis as the CJEUǯs 
departure from the confines of the Internal Market can be of aid in broadening the scope of the EUǯs CCP provided that a given EU measure falls within the remit 
of international trade and, more generally, is also in line with post Lisbon EU 
policy developments.  
The overarching changes brought about by the new globalisation forces of the 
21st century has also led to a new conceptualisation of EU trade policy, which 
was first envisioned in the 2010 Trade, Growth and World Affairs (TGWA) 
Strategy. 83 This Communication signaled a departure from EU trade policy 
largely based on trade in goods and customs tariffs to one based on the three 
pillars, of trade in goods, trade in services and investment with a focus on non-
tariff barriers, standards, domestic taxation and competition. At the same time, 
the TGWA recognised that globalisation processes impact negatively on certain 
sectors of the economy and specific categories of workers and cause 
environmental damage (thus suggesting the European Globalization Adjustment 
Fund (EGAF) as a means to provide some form of redress). In the new EU trade 
strategy Trade for all - Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy 84 
this shift in focus has been further expanded in order to include a parallel 
concern for the environment, human rights, including social rights with explicit 
reference to the EGAF as a meaningful remedy for consumers, workers and small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs). In addition, there is explicit reference to using 
trade agreements and trade preference programmes as levers to promote 
around the world values such as sustainable development, human rights, fair and 
                                                        
79 A. Dimopoulous, ǮThe Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism between )nternal and External Economic Relations?ǯ Ͷ Croatian Yearbook of European Law and 
Policy 2008, 102, at 118. 
80 Former Article 133 EC.  
81 See Dimopoulos, supra note 79.  
82 (. (. Voogsgeerd, ǮThe Nature of the Asymmetry between Trade and Labour Rights in Trade Agreements of the EUǯ, paper presented at the European Union in International Affairs (EUIA) 
Biennial Conference, Brussels, Belgium, 11-13 May 2016. This interpretative approach of the 
CJEU can be seen in the Daiichi Sankyo case where an act of the EU concerning intellectual 
property issues was in dispute; Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd and Sanofi-Aventis 
Deutschland GmbH v DEMO Anonymos Viomichaniki kai Emporiki Etairia Farmakon 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:520.  
83 COM(2010)612.  
84 Available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf >. 
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ethical trade and the fight against corruption as well as improving the 
responsibility of supply chains. 
 
4. EU TRADE EMBEDDED DEVELOPMENT MODELS  
 
4.1 UNILATERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS: THE GSP SCHEME The EUǯs GSP is an autonomous non-contractual and non-reciprocal trade 
arrangement which was first set up in 1971 (and since then subject to periodical 
revision) through which the EU provides preferential access to the EU market to 
a certain number of developing countries and territories, in the form of reduced 
tariffs for their goods when entering the EU market. To this end, it accords tariff 
preferences to countries, which fulfil certain economic criteria in terms of 
poverty and non-diversification of exports. Social considerations, however, were 
inserted in the scheme only in January 1995 when the new GSP scheme for 
industrial products entered into force. The first objective pursued by the GSP is to contribute to the growth of developing countriesǯ economies by helping them 
reduce poverty. Secondly, it also aims at improving their political and social 
situation by promoting good governance and sustainable development.  
In 2005 the GSP+ incentive regime was set up following the decision handed 
down by the WTO Appellate Body in January 2004, which upheld the findings of 
the WTO adjudicating panel concluding the WTO-inconsistency of the EUǯs GSP 
scheme in relation to its drug arrangements. 85 The incentive scheme offers 
additional benefits under certain conditions to support vulnerable countries in 
their ratification and implementation of international conventions, including ILO 
Conventions. To qualify for GSP+, countries must ratify and effectively 
implement international standards in the field of human rights, Core Labour 
Standards (CLS), sustainable development and good governance. 86 In particular, 
since 2005 GSP+ beneficiaries need to ratify and effectively implement all eight 
ILO fundamental conventions that together make up the four CLS, 87 which 
enhances the legitimacy of the ILO labour standards laid down in these 
conventions. 
                                                        
85 European Communities — Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries, WTO Doc WT/DSʹͶ͸/R ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ [͹.ͳ͸ͳ] ȋReport of the PanelȌ ȋǮTariff Preferences Panel 
ReportǯȌ; WTO Doc WT/DSʹͶ͸/AB/R, AB–2004–1 (2004) (Report of the Appellate BodyȌ ȋǮTariff 
Preferences Appellate Body ReportǯȌ. 
86 For a list of the 27 core conventions, see Annex VIII of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised 
tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, OJ L303/1, 31.10.2012, p. 
1.  
87 The eight ILO Conventions are: (i) freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
(Conventions 87 and 98); (ii) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour 
(Conventions 29 and 105); (iii) the effective abolition of child labour (Conventions 138 and 182); 
and (iv) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (Conventions 
100 and 111).  
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The preferences granted by the GSP+ may be withdrawn from the beneficiary if 
the latter fails to implement the necessary Conventions. There is also the special 
EBA arrangement, pursuant to which the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
receive full duty and quota-free access to the EU market with the exception of 
arms and armaments. The EU pursues a two-fold objective with these unilateral 
trade reference schemes: on the one hand, it rewards countries that are 
vulnerable but willing to ratify and implement key International Conventions on 
sustainable development, including human rights and CLS, with additional tariff 
reductions under GSP+; on the other hand, it will temporarily withdraw GSP 
preferences in case of serious and continued violations of these Conventions. As 
we will see in the next section, the EU has used its power to withdraw access 
from beneficiary countries very rarely, and only in response to grave violations 
of ILO labour standards rather than human rights more generally. The above 
buttresses arguments according to which, despite its purported development 
goals, and in particular as an effort to improve the value of preferences for the ǲneediestǳ, the GSP scheme is used as a tool to improve the EUǯS leverage in trade 
negotiations with emerging economies.  
 
Assessing the effectiveness of the trade-labour linkage in EU unilateral trade 
arrangements: the case of the GSP+  
Benefits under the GSP+ incentive scheme are seldom withdrawn. Where they are withdrawn this is temporary reflecting the EUǯs intention to use GSP conditionality as a ǲcarrotǳ, namely, an incentive to make progress on human 
rights, sustainable development and good governance.  
The effects of withdrawal of GSP+ benefits have varied. For example, in 2008 the 
Commission opened an investigation into El Salvador, following a judgment of the El Salvador Supreme Court that El Salvadorǯs ratification of )LO Convention 
No 87 on freedom of association and the right to organise was unconstitutional.88 
The prospect of loss of access to GSP+ benefits appears to have been 
instrumental in persuading the El Salvadorian government to amend the 
Constitution so as to render ratification of the Convention constitutional and the 
Commission therefore terminated the investigation as it found that there was no 
longer reason for justifying the temporary withdrawal of the GSP+. 89 Similarly, 
the Commission initiated an investigation into Bolivia concerning the effective 
implementation of the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 90 
                                                        
88 European Commission, Decision 2008/316/EC of 31 March 2008 providing for the initiation of 
an investigation pursuant to Article 18(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 with respect 
to the protection of the freedom of association and the right to organize in El Salvador OJ [2008] 
L 108/29, 18 April 2008.   
89 European Commission, Report of the Investigation pursuant to Article 18(2) of the Council 
Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 with respect to the protection of the freedom of association and 
the right to organize in El Salvador, C(2009) 7934 (2009). 
90 European Commission, Implementing Decision 2012/161/EU of 19 March 2012 providing for 
the initiation of an investigation pursuant to Article 17(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
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following Boliviaǯs decision to withdraw from the said Convention as of ͳ 
January 2012. However, Bolivia continued to give effect to the Convention and on ͳͲ January ʹͲͳ͵ Boliviaǯs request to re-accede was accepted. Consequently, the 
Commission stopped its investigation in March 2013.    
The case of Sri Lanka differs from those of El Salvador and Bolivia. A Commission 
investigation, drawing on United Nations (UN) reports and statements as well as 
findings of human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), found 
widespread violations of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the 1984 Convention against Torture (CAT) and the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The Commission proposal to 
withdraw access to the GSP+ from Sri Lanka that followed this investigation was 
not sufficiently persuasive to convince the Sri Lankan government to take 
adequate measures to address the violations identified by the investigation. Sri 
Lanka was then temporarily suspended from the GSP+ scheme in August 2010.91 
Prior to this the Commission had offered to delay the entry into force of the 
withdrawal by six months (decision was made in January 2010) in exchange of Ǯtangible and sustainable progress on a number of outstanding issuesǯ. 92 While it is not clear whether the EUǯs GSP+ scheme is fully WTO compliant – 
particularly with the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle (Article I:1 GATT) 
on the basis of the exceptions provided under Article XX GATT- questions have 
arisen concerning the lack of transparency in the decision-making process 
pursuant to which third countries are granted GSP+ preferences, as well as 
issues of selective conditionality and double standards. 93 There have also been 
questions concerning the review of implementation of the relevant Convention 
requirements for the granting of GSP+ benefits. In particular, the monitoring of 
the GSP+ has been subject to criticism due to various GSP+ beneficiary countries 
having a particularly poor record as regards one or more CLS. Infringements of 
CLS have often been reported 94 and the EU Parliament has continuously called 
upon the Commission to monitor more strictly the compliance with ILO labour 
standards and asked for the suspension of preferences in respect of countries 
that breach fundamental rights. In addition, according to a study conducted by 
                                                                                                                                                              
732/2008 with respect to the effective implementation of the United Nations Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs in Bolivia OJ [2012] L 80, 20.3.2012, p. 30. 
91 European Commission, Implementing Regulation (EU) No 143/2010 of 15 February 2010 
temporarily withdrawing the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and 
good governance provided under the Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 with respect to the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, OJ [2010] L 45/2010, 22.7.2010, p.1. 
92 European Commission, Press release, ǮEU regrets silence of Sri Lanka regarding preferential import regimeǯ of ͷ July ʹͲͳͲ, )P/ͳͲ/ͺͺͺ, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=589%20>, accessed 4 January 2016. 
93 See Velluti, supra note 37.  
94 EU Parliament, Report on the external dimension of social policy, promoting labour and social 
standards and European corporate social responsibility (2010/2205(INI)), Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs, A7-0172/2011, of 20 April 2011.  
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CARIS 95 the GSP+ scheme and its conditionality has not yet resulted in 
significant changes in the situation ǲon the groundǳ in beneficiary countries.  
Some of these problems have been addressed by the revised GSP which entered 
into force in 2014, examined below.  
 
Reform of the GSP 
In 2012 the EU adopted a reformed GSP law with the aim of strengthening the 
overall effectiveness of the GSP scheme. 96 The reform tackled some of the above 
problems. It reduced the number of beneficiaries focusing on those developing 
countries most in need and reinforcing the incentives in respect of core human 
and labour rights, and environmental and good governance standards. 97 With 
regard to the labour criteria for the GSP+, according to Article 9(1) of the 2012 
GSP Regulation a beneficiary country can now benefit from the enhanced 
preferences if: 
 
(1) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VIII and the most recent 
available conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies do not identify a Ǯserious failureǯ to effectively implement any of these conventions; 
(2) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the conventions 
listed in Annex VIII and to ensure their effective implementation; 
(3) it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by 
each convention and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular 
monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the 
provisions of the conventions listed in Annex VIII; and 
(4) it gives a binding undertaking to participate in and cooperate with the 
monitoring procedure referred to in Article 13. 
 
For Vogt 98 the revised eligibility criteria is a step back from the previous labour 
criteria as an applicant country could be deemed eligible for the GSP+ so long as the relevant monitoring bodies have not identified a ǲserious failureǳ to 
effectively implement the Conventions. He also argues that the standard of ǲserious failureǳ is too low and reference to most recent reports of monitoring 
bodies is limitative. Specifically, the Commission will consider whether there is a ǲseriousǳ violation for purposes of entry into the GSP+ only if there is a ǲspecial paragraphǳ in the report of the )LO Committee on Application of Standards ȋCASȌ 
                                                        
95 See CARIS, supra note 4, at 166. 
96 Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of Council of 25 October 2012 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008 OJ [2012] L303/1, 31.10.2012. 
97 The list of beneficiaries has been modified several times to reflect the exit from and the entry of 
countries newly meeting the eligibility conditions for each of the three types of arrangements 
since the first modifications effected with the 2012 reform, which at the time of writing is as 
follows: 30 GSP, 13 GSP+ and 49 EBA beneficiaries; European Commission, Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Report on the Generalised Scheme of 
Preferences Covering the Period 2014-2015, COM(2016) 29 final, Brussels, 28.1.2016.  
98 See J. Vogt, supra note 3.  
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to the International Labour Conference. There is no textual support in the 2012 
GSP Regulation for such a narrow interpretation and reference is made only in 
staff working documents of the Commission. Moreover, the restrictive 
interpretation of the entry criteria for the GSP+ does not take into account the 
overall supervisory system of the ILO which is made up of various committees of 
experts. This constitutes a significant limitation of the GSP+ scheme as it allows 
countries that do not comply with the ILO Conventions to become or remain 
GSP+ beneficiaries. For example, in 2014 Pakistan and Guatemala – two 
notorious labour rights violators- were granted GSP+. While the decision to 
include Pakistan in the GSP+ may have justification on humanitarian grounds 
further to the devastating flooding of 2010 thus showing a willingness on the 
part of the EU to support the economy of this country through trade measures, 
the inclusion of Guatemala in the GSP+ is more difficult to justify. It is 
particularly disconcerting considering that this country has appeared before the 
CAS more than any other country (including Myanmar which was suspended 
from the standard GSP scheme in 1997 for forced labour practices and reinstated 
only in 2012) and is faced with the continuous threat of a Commission of Inquiry 
at the ILO for serious and systematic violations of the Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87). 99 In 2011 the US 
initiated arbitration against Guatemala under Article 16(2)a of the 2004 
Dominican Republic - Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR).100 The US v Guatemala arbitration should have been a fairly 
expedited process further to Chapter 20 of the CAFTA-DR which provides for a 
fast-track arbitration procedure. However, after initiating this punitive approach 
the US subsequently moved to a more cooperative approach further to a series of 
enhanced labour enforcement measures that Guatemala agreed to pursue. These 
measures included the hiring of significant numbers of new labour inspectors 
and the creation of fast-track processes for labour courts to adopt fines recommended by Guatemalaǯs Ministry of Labor for labour law violations. (ence, 
the filing of a CAFTA state-to-state arbitration used as a ǲstickǳ clearly led to the diplomatic ǲengagementǳ between the US and Guatemala. In September 2014 the 
US announced that it would finally proceed to arbitration against Guatemala.  
Guatemala has ceased to be a GSP+ beneficiary country from January 1, 2016. 
However, the reason for this is that it benefits from preferential market access 
under the 2012 EU-Central America trade agreement and not because of a 
decision of the Commission to withdraw GSP+ preferential treatment for labour 
rights abuses.  
                                                        
99  Further information is available at 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50012:0::NO:50012:P50012_COMPLAINT_PRO
CEDURE_ID,P50012_LANG_CODE:3088000,en:NO> and 
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_419599.pdf>, accessed 4 January 2016. 
100  Further information is available at 
<http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/guatemalasub.htm>, accessed 4 January 2016. 
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The monitoring of GSP+ compliance has been enhanced and the Commission has 
a key monitoring function in relation to the status of ratification and effective 
implementation of the Conventions as well as ensuring that the beneficiaries cooperate with the Conventionsǯ monitoring bodies. Together with the European 
External Action Service ('EEAS'), the Commission has set up a structured monitoring process: an ongoing ǲGSP+ dialogueǳ with the beneficiary authorities, 
formalised through annual lists of issues known as ǲscorecardsǳ. Every two years 
the Commission reports to the EU Parliament and the Council on the fulfillment 
status of those conditions using scorecards for each GSP+ recipients.101 These 
scorecards are an important source of information for the Commission as it 
enables it not only to establish a form of cooperation with beneficiary countries 
through the so-called ǲGSP+ dialogueǳ but also to constructively discuss 
beneficiaries' commitments to the ILO Conventions within the relevant 
international organisations, such as the ILO Tripartite Committee on the 
Application of Standards or the ILO Governing Body. 102  The limitation of this 
monitoring system is that it lacks transparency as the evaluation contained in 
these scorecards is not publicly available. In addition, since it involves only state 
actors, it is difficult to know whether these scorecards actually lead to 
government consultations. 103 
In its 2016 report on the revised GSP scheme to the European Parliament and 
the Council, 104 which also includes an analysis of the GSP+ the Commission 
emphasised the importance of strengthening the EUǯs engagement with other 
international organisations, and their local offices in the beneficiary countries, 
such as the ILO and the United Nations (UN) to ensure that GSP+ monitoring and 
evaluation by the EU continuously takes into account their views and 
experiences. It also recognised the significance of a wide range of sources for 
gathering information including civil society, social partners, the European 
Parliament and the Council. GSP+ monitoring visits by the Commission, together 
with the assistance of EU Delegations, have also proven to be beneficial in this 
respect. The Commission has also stressed the importance of beneficiary 
countries taking ownership of the monitoring process and becoming more 
proactive in addressing the issues in the scorecards. In addition, the Commission 
                                                        
101 Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012, supra note 96.  
102 European Commission, Joint Staff Working Document 'The EU Special Incentive Arrangement 
for Sustainable Development and Good Governance ('GSP+') covering the period 2014 – 2015. 
Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council Report on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences during the period 2014 – 2015 
(COM(2016) 29 final), Brussels, 28.1.2016 (SWD(2016) 8 final). 
103 L. Van den Putte et al, ǮWhat social face of the new EU trade agreements? Beyond the Ǯsoftǯ approachǯ, ETU) Policy Brief, No. ͳ͵/ʹͲͳͷ, at 3, available at 
<file:///C:/Users/Utente/Downloads/Policy%20Brief%202015.13%20Van%20den%20Putte%
20et%20al.%20(1).pdf>.  
104 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, Report on the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Covering the Period 2014-2015, 
COM(2016) 29 final, Brussels, 28.1.2016. 
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has been funding cooperation projects in beneficiary countries such as the GSP+ 
pilot project on capacity building in partnership with the ILO in Pakistan, 
Mongolia, Guatemala and El Salvador to support local administrations to put 
administrative structures in place. 105  
The GSP+ status shall be withdrawn temporarily in respect of all or certain 
products originating in the beneficiary country if the beneficiary country does 
not respect its binding undertakings. 106 The burden of proof of compliance with 
the Conventions is now on the beneficiary country. If the Commission has a Ǯreasonable doubtǯ that the country is not respecting its binding undertakings, it 
shall adopt a decision to initiate the procedure for withdrawal and shall inform 
the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The Commission shall state 
grounds for the reasonable doubt, and specify a time not greater than six months 
for beneficiary country to submit its observations, during which the Commission 
will give every opportunity to cooperate. The Commission shall seek all 
information it considers necessary, inter alia, the conclusions and 
recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies and in drawing its 
conclusions, it shall assess all relevant information. 
To sum up, the reform has addressed some of the concerns previously raised by 
reducing the number of beneficiaries and by strengthening the monitoring of 
compliance. That said, the revised eligibility criteria, particularly those for the 
GSP+, are problematic as they can allow a country with a record of serious labour 
rights abuses to become eligible for the GSP+ scheme.  
 
4.2 REGIONAL AND BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
After the failure at multilateral level to include a social clause in the WTO, the EU 
has been increasingly including labour provisions in its bilateral and regional 
agreements. Since the 1990s, most EU preferential agreements contain 
provisions on labour standards and cooperation in social affairs. 107 In the early 
agreements social norms have been taken up as issues for cooperation between 
the EU and its trading partners. In subsequent agreements social norms have 
been raised to the status of human rights. 108 The EU approach largely relies on 
                                                        
105 As part of its on-going collaboration and cooperation with the ILO (ILO 2013), the European 
Commission has provided a grant to the ILO for a 2-year pilot-project to strengthen the capacity 
of public administrations to apply the eight Fundamental ILO Conventions. The project was 
launched on 1 October 2015 and consists of ILO technical assistance, workshops, trainings, as 
well as awareness-raising activities. 
106 As referred under Article 9, see Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012, supra note 96. 
107  Full text access to European FTAs and their labour provisions can be found at 
<http://ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-publications/free-trade-
agreements-and-labour-rights/WCMS_115822/lang--en/index.htm#P4_728>. 
108 For example, the Preambles of the ͳͻͻ͹ EUǯs Cooperation Agreements with Cambodia and 
Laos, Yemen and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia refer to the need to complement 
economic with social development as well as the respect for basic social rights. The 1999 EU-
South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa and the 2005 
EU-Algeria Association Agreement also refer to the need to respect fundamental social rights and 
provide for dialogue and cooperation in social matters. 
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cooperation and dialogue with a reluctance to use sanctions and a preference for 
civil society involvement. 
The 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) 109 occupies a particularly 
prominent position as it is the most comprehensive partnership agreement 
between developing countries. The CPA, which provides the framework for 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, reflects a policy shift in EU 
development policy from preferential market access to mutual free trade 
between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions, in which 
development is the overriding goal. However, this shift to differentiated reciprocity is partially based on the EUǯs own commitment to make its trade 
agreements compatible with the WTO rules. So this change is guided, to a certain 
extent, by self-interest. Nevertheless, it is still noteworthy that both the EU and 
the ACP countries have equally committed themselves to respect CLS and to 
enhance cooperation in this area, for example, through the adoption and 
enforcement of legislation and, at the same time, rejecting the use of labour 
standards for protectionist purposes, as provided in Article 50, which is the key 
labour clause of the agreement. The latter is mainly promotional in nature, 
reaffirming standards that do not create binding obligations and which, 
according to Alston, may undermine )LOǯs supervision. 110 Kenner maintains that 
Article 50 should not be viewed in isolation but within the broader context of the agreementǯs trade and development regime.111 In particular, the labour clause Ǯentrenches the CLS within the partnership as recommended by the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (WCSDG).ǯ In particular, it 
is based on the view that the objectives of the ILO can be best achieved with the 
cooperation of regional actors and through transposition into the CPA of those obligations stemming from the ͳͻͻͺ )LOǯs Declaration, which in in turn are Ǯsubject to the oversight of the parties and coordinated action under the EU-ILO strategic partnership.ǯ 112 This is reflected in Article 8 which clearly states that 
priority is given to political dialogue in relation to the essential elements (Annex 
VII) to avoid scenarios in which a party might deem it justified to activate the 
non-execution clause provided in Article 96. The latter foresees the holding of 
consultations, excepted in the cases of Ǯspecial urgencyǯ, in circumstances where 
a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfill an obligation stemming 
                                                        
109 The CPA was concluded for a 20-year period from 2000 to 2020 between the EU and 79 ACP 
countries. Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other 
part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, OJ L317, 15/12/2000, p. 3. It has been revised twice: in 
Luxembourg on 25 June 2005, (OJ [2005] L 209, 11/08/2005, p. 27) and in Ouagadougou on 22 
June 2010 (OJ [2010] L 287, 04/11/2010, p. 3). 
110 P. Alston, ǮǲCore Labour Standardsǳ and the Transformation of the )nternational Labour Rights Regimeǯ ȋʹͲͲͶȌ ͳͷȋ͵Ȍ European Journal of International Law 511.  
111 J. Kenner, ǮEconomic Partnership Agreements: Enhancing the Labour Dimension of Global Governance?ǯ in B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters ȋedsȌ The EU’S role in global 
governance: the legal dimension (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013) p. 316.  
112 idem.  
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from the essential elements clause. It is only when these consultations between 
the parties fail that appropriate measures may be taken. In any event, these 
measures shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for taking them have 
disappeared.  
Article 9 envisages several features which link development and human rights to 
labour standards and social policies. 113 First, development is Ǯcentred on the human personǯ, who is seen as the protagonist and beneficiary for development, entailing Ǯrespect for and promotion of all human rights.ǯ Respect for human 
rights is regarded as integral to sustainable development. 114 Second, the 
definition of human rights includes respect for fundamental social rights. In 
addition, the CPA provides for the use of dispute settlement in relation to the 
interpretation and application of their human rights clauses, including 
appropriate measures adopted under these clauses. 115  However, what is 
problematic is that the essential elements clause in Article 9(2) has been invoked 
to initiate a consultation procedure mainly for coups d'état or flawed election 
processes with a reluctance to use it in relation to social and economic rights.116 
Besides these more technical legal aspects of the agreement, the CPA seems to 
have had a negative impact on local communities as tariff liberalization has led to 
an increase in unemployment levels in certain key agriculture sectors and, in 
some instances, to their collapse such as in the case of poultry meat 
production.117 The CPA therefore, seems to be instrumental to the EUǯs need to 
have access to the markets of emerging economies rather than to the 
development needs of third countries.  
In addition, with the exception of Article 50 of the CPA, social norms in EU 
agreements seem to have been included as objectives to be achieved under the 
umbrella term of ǲsustainable developmentǳ rather than enforceable legal 
commitments as they do not provide for genuine enforcement mechanisms. As Bartels points out Ǯit is notable that the principle of sustainable development has 
never been treated as a concrete obligation in itself: none of the agreements 
                                                        
113 See J. Kenner, supra note 111, at 315.  
114 idem.  
115 Cfr. with the EU-Central America Association Agreement, which provides that an affected 
party can request that an urgent meeting be called to bring the Parties together within fifteen 
days for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to 
the Parties, see Article 355(5).  
116 E.g. The coup d'état in Guinea Bissau in 2003, the coup d'état in Central African Republic in ʹͲͲ͵ and flawed elections in Togo in ʹͲͲ͵, for further analysis, see L. Mbangu, ǮRecent Cases of 
Article ͻ͸ Consultationsǯ European Centre for Development Policy Management ȋECDPMȌ, 
Discussion Paper No. 64C, August 2005.  
117 A. Kwa, P. Lunenborg and W. Musonge, ǮAfrican, Caribbean and Pacific ȋACPȌ countries' 
position on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)ǯ Study for the EU Parliament, Directorate-
General for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, Brussels, April 2014, 
EXPO/B/DEVE/2013/30; J. T. Gathii, ǮThe Cotonou Agreement and Economic and Partnership Agreementsǯ in United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner Realizing the 
Right to Development: Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration on 
the Right to Development / (New York, Geneve: United Nations 2013), 259-273. 
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admit the possibility of violating the principle of sustainable development.ǯ 118 
This is because Ǯthe exact implications of sustainable development for trade 
agreements are far from clear due to the normative uncertainty surrounding the 
concept of sustainable development, which has played out differently in varied 
contexts and is still subject to evolution.ǯ 119 The agreements contain provisions on cooperation and obligations to respect and ǲstriveǳ to improve multilateral 
and domestic labour and environmental standards. 120 In particular, a first set of 
obligations contain minimum obligations to implement certain multilateral 
obligations and other obligations which require the parties to the agreement not 
to reduce their levels of protection and encouraging them to raise their levels of 
protection, subject to a proviso that this is not done for protectionist 
purposes.121 With the turn in the 1990s to social trade at the regional and 
bilateral levels, sustainable development has become increasingly important in the EUǯs trade policy 122 and the Treaty of Lisbon has elevated it to one of the key 
principles underlying EU external action. 123  
This overarching legal commitment has been given further effect with the 
adoption of so-called ǲnew generationǳ of trade agreements containing a ǲtrade and sustainable developmentǳ chapter, which includes provisions for the respect 
of labour and environmental standards. Examples of such agreements are the 
2011 EU-Korea FTA, 124 the 2012 EU-Central America Agreement 125 and the 
2012 EU- Colombia/Peru Agreement. 126  The 2013 EU-Singapore FTA (which is 
awaiting ratification) also contains such chapter. 127 The 2008 CARIFORUM-EU 
                                                        
118 L. Bartels, Ǯ(uman Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreementsǯ ͶͲ Legal Issues of Economic Integration 2013, 306.  
119 G. M. Durán, Ǯ)nnovations and )mplications of the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter 
in the EU–Korea Free Trade Agreementǯ in J. (arrison ȋed.Ȍ The European Union and South 
KoreaThe Legal Framework for Strengthening Trade, Economic and Political Relations (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press 2013) p. 126. 
120 For further analysis, see L. Bartels, ǮSocial issues: labour, environment and human rightsǯ in S. 
Lester and B. Mercurio (eds) Bilateral and regional trade agreements (CUP 2009) p. 342.  
121 L. Bartels, supra note 118, at 307-309.  
122 The first of the EUǯs agreements to make reference to the principle of sustainable 
development was the 1993 EU-Hungary Europe Agreement, see L. Bartels, supra note 118, 306.  
123 Article 21(2)d and (3) TEU.  
124 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States of the one part, 
and the Republic of Korea of the other part (EU-Korea FTA) OJ [2011] L127/6, 14 May 2011, p. 6. 
It entered into force in July 2011 and it is the EU's first trade agreement with an Asian country. It 
is also the first completed agreement in a new generation of FTAs launched by the EU in 2007 as 
part of its strategy to create ǲdeep and comprehensiveǳ free trade agreements ȋDCFTAȌ with 
selective partners following the Doha round stand-still at the WTO. On this point see, F. (offmeister, ǮThe European Union as an )nternational Trade Negotiatorǯ in J. Koops and G. Macaj 
(eds) The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Palgrave Macmillan 2014), Ch. 9.  
125 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, 
on the one hand, and Central America on the other (EU-CAAA) OJ [2012] L346/3, 15 December 
2012, p. 3.  
126 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and 
Colombia and Peru, of the other part OJ [2012] L354/3, 21 December 2012, p. 3. 
127 It is the first bilateral agreement concluded by the EU with an Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) country and it has provided the blueprint for future bilateral agreements with 
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agreement is worthy of mention as it is the first EPA concluded with a regional 
group. 128 Since the conclusion of this agreement, the inclusion of a specific 
chapter setting out cooperation and commitments in relation to sustainable 
development has become systematic. It includes a reference to the ILO Decent 
Work Agenda (DWA) and CLS and the clauses are worded in such a manner 
suggesting that there is also reference to labour rights rather than merely 
standards or principles. For example, Article 72 provides that investors are 
required to act in accordance with ILO CLS and Article 73 provides that 
promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) does not take place by lowering 
domestic environmental, labour or occupational health and safety legislation and 
standards. 129 It also has a separate chapter on social aspects of trade. 130 
Another innovative feature of this EPA is, firstly, the setting up of the Joint Council, which has Ǯthe power to take decisions in respect of all matters covered by the Agreement.ǯ 131 Secondly, the EPA provides for a consultation and 
monitoring process, under which each party may request consultations on the 
interpretation and application of the social clauses in the agreement, with an 
advisory role for the ILO. 132 The agreement also envisages that in the event of 
continued disagreement a Committee of Experts may be convened. 133  
In general terms, while there is some variation between the provisions contained 
in the different agreements, there seems to be some level of commonality as to 
the substantive standards and the institutional set-up envisaged. Indeed we can 
identify a common core of the new generation of trade agreements such as a 
reaffirmation by the parties of their general commitment to promote trade in a 
way that fosters sustainable development; a reaffirmation that countries have 
the freedom to define their own level of social and environmental protection, and 
that social and environmental standards should not be used for protectionist 
purposes; a commitment to ǲstriveǳ towards high levels of social and 
                                                                                                                                                              
other ASEAN countries; Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Singapore, 17 
October 2014, Authentic text as of May 2015 available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961>. The Commission has submitted a 
request for an Opinion of the CJEU in relation to the competence of the EU and the Member States 
and ultimately concerning the legal status of the agreement as a mixed agreement, see Opinion 
2/15 Request for an opinion submitted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 218(11) 
TFEU, OJ [2015] C 363/22, 3.11.2015.  
128 The regional group comprises 15 Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Lucia, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, St Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago; Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, of the other part (OJ [2008] L289, 30/10/2008, p. 3). 
129 For commentary on the investment provisions of the 2008 CARIFORUM-EU EPA, see P. J. Cardwell and D. French, ǮThe European Union as a Global )nvestment Partner: Law, Policy and 
Rhetoric in the Attainment of Development Assistance and Market Liberalisation?ǯ in C. Brown 
and K. Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2011), 201-222. 
130 2008 CARIFORUM-EU EPA, Articles 191-196. 
131 2008 CARIFORUM-EU EPA, Article 229(1).  
132 2008 CARIFORUM-EU EPA, Article 195.  
133 idem.  
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environmental protection by: a) implementing the ILO Conventions and other 
multilateral  instruments applicable to the parties and b) respecting, promoting 
and realizing in their laws and practice the CLS and associated ILO Conventions 
proclaimed in the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
of 1998; a commitment to cooperate to develop trade schemes and trade 
practices favouring sustainable development; and a commitment not to lower or 
fail to apply social and environmental standards with a view to encouraging 
trade or attracting investment.  
The 2011 EU-Korea FTA and the 2012 TA Columbia and Peru include a reference 
to decent work and four CLS; in addition to the latter agreements, the 2012 EU-
CAAA refers to the need to implement fundamental ILO Conventions, contained 
in the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
These three agreements all exemplify the EU predilection for soft conditionality. 
In particular, the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter (Chapter 13) of 
the 2011 EU-Korea FTA has served as a model for other FTA negotiations, 134 
following the adoption of the Global Europe Strategy. 135 It exemplifies a new trend in the EUǯs regulatory approach to the integration of trade and environmental/labour issues at the bilateral level according to which Ǯtrade-
labour and trade-environmental linkages are no longer conceived as exception 
clauses that are permissive and conditional in nature, but are further elaborated through positive commitments, as well as cooperative measures.ǯ 136 The 2014 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 137 stands 
out for its detailed provisions on labour issues. This is to be expected given that 
it is the first comprehensive economic agreement with a highly industrialised 
developed country, which shares a similar set of values and principles as well 
similar political and legal traditions with EU Member States. In the 2014 EU-
CETA there are separate chapters on Trade and Sustainable Development, 138 
Trade and Labour 139 and also Trade and Environment. 140 The Chapter on Trade 
and Labour is far more detailed than the one of the 2011 EU-Korea FTA and the 
degree of legal obligation is phrased in stronger terms. The focus is on the 
effective enforcement of labour provisions as can be seen by the binding language 
used, such as ǲshall ensureǳ. 141 )n particular, it is stated that the Parties Ǯshall ensureǯ that their labour laws embody the eight )LO CLS fundamental 
                                                        
134 See G. M. Durán, supra note 119, 124-145. 
135 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 4 October ʹͲͲ͸ ǮGlobal Europe: Competing in the worldǯ COM(2006) 567 final.  
136 See G. M. Durán, supra note 119, at 135. 
137 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and 
the European Union and its Member States of the other part, Consolidate Text published 26 
September 2014, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf>. 
138 2014 EU-CETA, Chapter 22.  
139 2014 EU-CETA, Chapter 23. 
140 2014 EU-CETA, Chapter 24. 
141 E.g. 2014 EU-CETA, Articles 23.3 and 23.5 para. 2.  
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Conventions. 142 The 2014 EU-CETA also refers to specific labour law rights 
related to the ILO DWA, namely, health and safety at work and the prevention of 
occupational injuries; acceptable minimum employment standards for wage 
earners and non-discrimination of working conditions, including for migrant 
workers. 143 In addition, a party is not allowed to waive or derogate from its 
labour law and standards in order to promote trade or investment and through a 
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, fail to effectively enforce its 
labour law and standards for the same reasons. 144 Each Party shall encourage 
public debate and promote public awareness of its labour standards and their 
enforcement. 145 The 2014 EU-CETA, therefore, contains a fairly robust labour-
related chapter which combines promotional with more binding elements. 
The 2016 EU-Vietnam FTA 146 is also noteworthy. The FTA makes an institutional 
and legally binding linkage to the 2012 EU-Vietnam Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA). 147 Significantly, in the latter agreement the commitment of 
both parties to the respect for human rights through the human rights clause and 
the promotion of sustainable development have been included in one article, 
which seems to suggest that sustainable development has gained further 
prominence. 148 The FTA contains a Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter, 
which includes obligations for both the EU and Vietnam with regard to a core set 
of multilateral standards and agreements on labour and environment, ensuring 
the respect by both parties of fundamental workers' rights as well as furthering 
environmental governance. 149  With regard to labour provisions, there is 
reference to specific commitments on the effective implementation of each of the 
four ILO CLS and of all the ratified ILO Conventions (not only the fundamental 
ones), as well as progress towards ratification of non-ratified fundamental ILO 
                                                        
142 2014 EU-CETA, Article 23.3, par. 1. This is particularly significant given that to date Canada 
has ratified six of the eight Fundamental Conventions (Conventions No. 29, No. 87, No. 100, No. 
105, No. 111 and No. 182). .  
143 2014 EU-CETA, Article 23.3 para. 2.  
144 2014 EU-CETA, Article 23.4, paras. 2 and 3.  
145 2014 EU-CETA, Article 23.6, paras. 1 and 2. 
146 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
Agreed Text as of January 2016, available at 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437>; see also European Commission, Ǯ(uman Rights and Sustainable Development in the EU-Vietnam Relations with specific regard to 
the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreementǯ, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, ʹ͸.ͳ.ʹͲͳ͸, SWDȋʹͲͳ͸Ȍ ʹͳ final; for academic commentary see T. M. (. (oang et al. ǮLabour Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements: Potential Opportunities or Challenges to Vietnam?ǯ 
SECO Working Paper 2/14, World Trade Institute, University of Bern, 27 May 2014, available at 
<http://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/32/31/3231e444-9a9b-4fe2-a24f-
38acc5aefa98/wti_seco_wp_02_2014.pdf>.  
147 E.g. Preamble, Articles X. 17 and 21 of the Chapter on Institutional, General and Final 
Provisions (CIGF), Ch. 17, 2016 EU-Vietnam FTA; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part of 27 June 2012, available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e9d99d61-6897-11e3-a7e4-
01aa75ed71a1.0011.01/DOC_2&format=PDF>.  
148 2012 EU-Vietnam PCA, Article 1(1) and (3). 
149 2016 EU-Vietnam FTA, Ch. 15. 
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Conventions. 150  Overall, these new provisions clearly indicate a stronger 
domestic political commitment to labour reforms that will ensure a more 
developed domestic labour legal framework, improvement of the enforcement of 
domestic labour law system. It is noticeable however that a legally binding language is absent and the more nuanced terms of ǲrecognizeǳ, ǲreaffirm its commitmentǳ or ǲwill make continued and sustained effortsǳ are used as opposed to the stronger term of ǲshall ensureǳ. 151 
With regard to the institutional provisions, at government level, ministerial 
contact points, specialized committees and/or boards of senior officials for the 
purpose of implementing the trade and sustainable development chapter have 
been set up. Government officials meet annually with labour and environmental 
experts in the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, which has 
been established to oversee the implementation of the Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapter. As regards civil society and social partners, the 2011 EU-
Korea agreement provides for Domestic Advisory Groups for each party made up 
of civil society, business, social partners and other experts from relevant 
stakeholder groups, which meet at an annual Civil Society Forum. 152 Similarly, 
the 2012 EU-Colombia/Peru 153 and EU-CAAA 154 agreements mandate each 
party and the subcommittee/board to meet with existing national advisory 
groups (or to create new ones) and civil society on a regular basis.  
The increased involvement and influence of the EU Parliament in the conclusion 
of trade treaties further to the changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is 
pivotal to this development and for a number of years it has been calling for the 
practice and policy developed in the context of cooperation and association 
agreements containing chapters on human rights to be extended to ǲpureǳ trade 
agreements. 155 While these are significant features of the ǲnew generationǳ of trade agreements, 
which contribute to injecting a social dimension into the EUǯs external trade 
policy, it remains to be seen whether they entail an improvement of the 
implementation-capacity of developing countries to respect and protect labour 
standards and thus lead to an effective improvement of labour standards 
internationally. To date whether the EU soft conditionality works remains an 
open question. When countries adopt a clear resistant and/or obstructionist 
approach particularly towards full compliance with ILO Conventions, then this 
approach will be ineffective. The substantive norms that these new type of 
agreements introduce to achieve the sustainability objectives are Ǯformulated in 
                                                        
150 2016 EU-Vietnam FTA Article 3, Ch. 15. 
151 idem.  
152 2011 EU-Korea FTA, Article 13.12(3)-(5) and Article 13.13.  
153 2012 EU-Colombia/Peru, Article 282. 
154 2012 EU-CAAA, Part III.  
155 EP Resolution of 25 November 2010 on human rights, social and environmental standards in 
international trade agreements, P7_TA(2010)0434, § 12; EP Resolution of 27 September 2011 on 
a new trade policy for Europe under the EU 2020 strategy, P7_TA(2011)0412, § 6.  
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such manner that it often seems hard or even impossible to prove that a party is not meeting its obligations.ǯ 156 Enforcement remains weak as any dispute 
concerning the trade and sustainable development chapters should be resolved 
solely through the specific dispute settlement procedure provided therein, as 
recourse to the general dispute settlement procedures available under the FTAs 
is explicitly excluded for matters falling under the chapter. In most cases there is 
a tendency to delegate disputes to a more neutral Panel of Experts. In some 
instances, there are no provisions in case of non-compliance and there is a lack of 
representativity of the social partners such as in the case of the EU-South Korea 
agreement where some trade unions and organized civil society representatives 
have been excluded from the Korean Domestic Advisory Group.  
In addition, there is a risk of overlap between the implementation of the Trade 
and Sustainable Development Chapter provisions and the obligations that arise 
from the human rights clauses. )LOǯs CLS are also human rights and the 
Commission itself considers that they are covered by the standard human rights 
clauses. 157 This is not a mere theoretical issue: whether a labour violation falls 
within the scope of the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter or that of a 
human rights clause has significant implications in terms of enforceability. 158 )n essence, there are two parallel co-existing systems: on the one hand, human rights and democratic principles with a strong monitoring and enforcement mechanism, which is seldom applied and, on the other hand, the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter with a weak monitoring and enforcement mechanism, which impedes any form of effective enforceability of the labour provisions. These different approaches of the EU are problematic because they undermine the EUǯs obligation to respect the indivisibility of all human rights. Moreover, including labour provisions under the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter weakens their human rights connotation.  
Despite the limited enforceability of labour provisions in the ǲnew generationǳ of trade agreements in the short term, their inclusion may have nevertheless 
important policy learning effects in the longer term such as providing the ground 
for transnational advocacy building and, linked to this, a better understanding of 
the challenges faced by a given third country, thus reducing negative 
externalities on affected stakeholders and communities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
156 W. Douma, ǮThe Promotion of Sustainable Development through EU Trade )nstrumentsǯ in L. 
Pantaleo and M. Andenas (eds), C. Reul (ass. Ed.) The European Union as a Global Model for Trade 
and Investment, University of Oslo Faculty of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 2016-
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157 L. Bartels, supra note 118, at 312.  
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5. CONCLUSION: GLOBAL HUMAN DIGNITY THROUGH EU SOCIAL 
CONDITIONALITY 
The interconnectedness between trade and labour in the context of new and 
more complex globalisation and transnational forces has not only become 
conspicuous but arguably also stronger. The emergence and further 
development of a global human rights regulatory ǲnetworkǳ for institutionalising 
global regulation of human rights at work confirms this interdependence. This 
regulatory network utilises both hard and soft law approaches to governance. 
Soft law instruments, such as positive commitments, political dialogue and 
cooperative measures, can ensure a better impact of hard law instruments. Both 
the EU and the ILO have developed soft law strategies to its toolkit of 
instruments deployed in their joint efforts to achieve ǲdecent workǳ. 159 
In spite of these EU-ILO joint efforts problems concerning the enforceability (and 
thus credibility) of social conditionality in EU trade agreements remain. EU 
practice does not always reflect the objectives set out in EU discourse on social 
trade. In situating EU practice within the EU external relationsǯ normative 
context and mission post Lisbon, 160 it becomes clear that human rights clauses 
and the trade and sustainable development chapters are not mere EU foreign 
policy instruments but rather mechanisms that the EU should use to comply with 
its obligations under the EU Treaties. 161 Indeed, Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU 
recognise economic and social rights as a matter of justice, which must be 
extended also to external trade relations. Moreover, Article 21(3) TEU refers to 
the external aspects of its other policies and thus extends the scope of application of the EUǯs external human rights obligations. This provision is also 
normatively stronger than Article 21(1) TEU because it employs the terms ǲrespectǳ. 162 This argument finds further confirmation in ATAA where the CJEU 
held that Article 3(5) TEU establishes a positive duty for the EU to observe 
international law in its entirety.163 However, the above provisions do not require 
the EU to pursue these objectives in any specific way and the EU is not formally 
bound by any multilateral or regional human rights treaty. 164 In addition, the EU 
                                                        
159 E.g. the Better Work programme, which is a partnership between the ILO and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), more information is available at 
<www.betterwork.org>; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 
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Change [2011] ECR I-13755, at paras. 101 and 123.  
164 The only exception being the 2008 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), which the EU ratified in 2010.  
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does not have a general competence in the field of human rights. This 
notwithstanding, Article 21(2)b and d TEU includes human rights, sustainable 
economic, social and environmental development of developing countries among 
the objectives of EU external action. Article 3(5) TEU refers to the Union 
upholding and promoting its values and, according to Article 2 TEU, the respect 
for human dignity and human rights features among the values of the EU.  
With these important considerations in mind, what are the changes necessary for 
the EU to comply with these obligations? With regard to social conditionality in 
EU unilateral trade arrangements and, in particular the GSP+, the Commission 
should adopt a more comprehensive and cohesive approach in the way that it 
utilises the documents of )LOǯs supervisory bodies to ensure that it always 
intervenes in cases of blatant labour rights violations. In particular, this means 
that it should aim at reducing its selective conditionality by giving more weight to )LO reports and its supervisory bodiesǯ findings and exercise more pressure 
on beneficiary countries in cases where there is strong evidence of labour rights 
abuses. With regard to the new generation of trade agreements, one solution 
could be the amendment of the provisions of the Trade and Sustainable 
Development Chapter so as to tailor them to the specificities of the third country 
that is party to the agreement. This could be along similar lines as those already 
proposed by Bartels in relation to the adoption of a new human rights clause. 165 
Other proposals for improving the effectiveness of social conditionality in 
bilateral and regional agreements are: the development of time-bound labour-
related objectives to trade agreements, greater involvement and consultation of 
social partners and civil society in the negotiations and implementation of labour 
provisions, to ensure better coherence in the way that ILO instruments are 
included in the various trade agreements, 166  and to improve current 
mechanisms for reviewing the impact of international agreements such as ex 
ante Ǯtrade sustainability impact assessmentsǯ ȋhereafter ǲtrade S)AsǳȌ, which the 
EU has been conducting  prior to the conclusion of each trade agreement as part of the EUǯs sustainable development policy (focusing in particular on economic 
development, social development and environmental protection). 167 These ex 
ante trade SIAs should be increasingly informed by human rights considerations 
                                                        
165 L. Bartels, ǮA Model (uman Rights Clause for the EUǯs )nternational Trade Agreementsǯ 
German Institute for Human Rights, Misereor, February 2014, available at <http://www.institut-
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166 ILO, Report on The Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements, 6 November 2013, 6-7, 
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and combined with ex post evaluations to assess the human rights impact and 
review the implementation of trade agreements. 168 In this regard, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has recommended that trade 
agreements be adopted provisionally with sunset clauses, namely a provision 
that it shall automatically cease to have effect after a specific date unless further 
action is taken to extend it, so as to allow for modifications in case their 
implementation is found by independent assessments to be generating human 
rights violations.169 
These proposals for improving social conditionality in EU trade agreements need 
to be taken a step further and evaluated also in light of the fact that the territorial 
reach of EU law is rapidly expanding. It is thus necessary to graft a ǲhumaneness 
testǳ (here defined as ǲpractical humanityǳ) onto external trade policies, which 
have development-related objectives. This would be in line with the EUǯs global 
ethics of aspiration and it would require the EU not to undertake trade 
obligations, which would undermine its ability to fulfill its human rights 
obligations. Equally, it would require the EU not to conclude trade agreements, which if implemented, would undermine a third countryǯs capacity to fulfill its 
human rights duties. Frente Polisario 170  buttresses these claims. These 
extraterritorial duties are arguably necessary to give human rights meaning and, 
in particular, to ensure dignified standards of work and living conditions for the 
population of third countries that are parties to an international agreement 
concluded with the EU thus giving effect in this manner to the obligations arising 
from the EU Treaties.   
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